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Competitiveness and Labor Law: Are We Talking
About Legal Issues?
Richard Martin Lyon*
In keeping with the theme of this conference I would like to ask: When
we look at the impact of labor management relations on global compet-
itiveness, are we talking about legal issues?
I will try to answer this question in three steps. First, I will examine
the leading themes in the employment relations law of the United States
and Canada, and compare them with similar laws in Japan and Great
Britain. Second, I will look at what happens when businesses shift their
strategies to human concerns. Do they become more competitive?
Third, I will introduce you to some new thoughts and new ways of look-
ing at competitiveness that transcend national or legal environments.
These ideas come mostly from across the Pacific but are available to us
for the cost of a library card.
To begin with, let us define competitiveness: "National competitive-
ness... [is a nation's] ability to produce, distribute and service goods in
the international economy of competition with goods and services pro-
duced in other countries, and to do so in a way that earns a rising stan-
dard of living."' Note that this definition leaves out a favorable balance
of trade, a positive current account, or an increase in foreign exchange
reserves. It simply refers to an increase in the standard of living. This
means rising earnings, steady employment and growing purchasing
power - not job scarcity and a minimum wage in the service industries.
I. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS LAWS & PRACTICE
A. The United States
International competitiveness was never a consideration when the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") became law in 1935. The
years before had seen labor violence and work stoppages. Undoubtedly
productivity also suffered, but even in the midst of depression our huge
margin for waste was still working for us. The rationale for the new law
was to end unrest, to make labor relations relatively peaceful and predict-
able.2 The NLRA was not a framework for encouraging a creative part-
* Partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois. Past Management Co-
Chair of the American Bar Association's Committee on International Labor Law.
1 B. ScoTr & G. LODGE, U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 14-15 (1985).
2 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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nership between management and labor. That law saw labor and
management as natural adversaries and that is still true of the Act to this
very day.
Only recently, in 1986-87, did the United States Department of La-
bor decide to find out whether U.S. labor law hampered or encouraged a
cooperative relationship between management and labor. The Secretary
of Labor hastened to reassure both the business and labor constituencies
that there was no hidden intent here to change the laws; just to look at
them from the perspective of labor management cooperation.3
The experts who volunteered their views to the Secretary fell into
three major groupings. There were those, mostly from management,
who felt that U.S. labor law contained too many impediments to cooper-
ation; the law makes it extremely difficult for employers to be other than
"totally adversarial" in their relations with the unions, they said.4
Others, mostly from the union side, found labor law to be the source of
power in the marketplace and wanted the law changed to increase union
bargaining power and impose restrictions on the employers.'
A third group, mostly people from the universities, complained of
the excessive juridification of labor law. They believe the law has become
the goal, losing sight of social and economic purposes. In general the
academics would force employers to recognize unions, not workers, as
equal partners in labor-management relations.6
There were a few management spokespersons who disagreed with all
of this on the basis of their experience with cooperative labor-manage-
ment relations with their unions within the frame work of the current
labor law.7
B. Canada
Canada and its provinces operate under a labor law system very sim-
ilar to the U.S. system.8 In Canada each province has its own labor rela-
tions system, reflecting the general political will of the electorate.
Ontario, for instance, can be characterized as giving the unions more
advantages than can be found in the United States, while British Colum-
bia, in its most recently rewritten labor relations statute, returns to a
position more closely resembling that in the United States.9 Ontario, for
3 BUREAU OF LAB. MGMT. REL. AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT-FIRST INTERIM REPORT-A WORKING DOCUMENT 28 (Feb.
1987).
4 Id. at 2-3.
5 Id. at 4-5.
6 Id. at 5-11. Of particular interest are the remarks on the "excessive juridification" of Ameri-
can labor law by Professor Myron J. Roomkin. Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 12.
8 See generally G. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW (1985).
9 British Columbia Industrial Relations Act, reprinted in CANADIAN LABOUR LAW REPORTS
1 2501.
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example, bolsters the unions by imposing contractual terms by way of an
arbitrated agreement if the employer and the union cannot work out
their first contract. Ontario also imposes a union shop on the new par-
ties. To my mind the most important advantage that unions have in On-
tario and in many other Canadian provinces is that they need not prove
their majority status through a secret ballot election if they have authori-
zation cards of forty-five percent of the workforce in the bargaining unit.
Generally no questions are raised as to how these cards were obtained.
We should not leave the subject of the labor relations law of Canada
and the United States without noting the growing influence of the courts
in both countries on the new employment law, the "post-employment-at-
will" law. The courts now extend to white collar employees (and this
includes business executives and clerks) a degree of job security enjoyed
historically only by workers under negotiated grievance procedures.
Viewed from the competitiveness aspect, this has probably resulted in
employers being forced to retain substandard employees at least until
ample documentation is developed to convince judges and juries of the
correctness of the initial discharge decision. Poorly executed dismissals
over a six-year period in California have cost employers more than half a
million dollars in each case of the seventy-two percent which has gone to
a jury.10
C. Japan
Japan, our most notable international competitor, also operates
under North American style labor law - in theory. American or Cana-
dian labor lawyers reading the Trade Union Act of Japan" for the first
time are likely to pronounce themselves experts by nightfall. The simi-
larities are striking although in some respects Japan goes much further
than either the United States or Canada. Japan, for example, provides
Japanese workers with a constitutional guarantee and a fundamental
human right to organize and to bargain collectively. 12 These guarantees,
as well as the law of unfair labor practices, are based on the old Wagner
10 Wrongful-firing Lawsuits Are on the Rise, Investor's Daily, Feb. 3, 1988, at 1. See also Bu-
REAU OF NAT'L AFF., DAILY LAB. REP., CALIFORNIA STATISTICS FOR 1987 SUGGEST STABILIZA-
TION IN PLAINTIFF ANARDS A-3 (Feb. 8, 1988).
11 Trade Union Act, No. 174 (Japan 1949).
12 KENPO (Constitution) art. XXVIII (Japan). Professor Tadashi A. Hanami writes that the
"eternal and inviolable" right of workers to organize which is guaranteed by article 28 of the Consti-
tution is according
to most Japanese labor law scholars... sacred and holy ' a mythology that can be found
in hardly any other civilized country. Article 28 of the Constitution states that the work-
ers' right to bargain and to act collectively, together with their right to organize, are funda-
mental human rights. Japanese labor lawyers are proud of this constitutional provision,
since few countries other than socialist and developing nations recognize as human rights
in their constitutions the right to bargain and to act collectively.
T. HANAMI, The Function of the Law in Japanese Industrial Relations, in CONTEMPORARY INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 162 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).
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Act, that is, U.S. law as it existed before 1946. The constitutional status
of the right to organize and bargain collectively in Japan has legalized
the use of nearly any means to force workers to join unions, even where
this involves activities which under other circumstances would be consid-
ered unlawful. Mass picketing, which blocks the flow of traffic into a
plant is generally permitted, as is picketing of the homes of executives. t3
You would think that all this would translate into a very strong
union movement. The fact is that this has not happened in the private
sector, and the unions continue to lose strength in Japan as they do in the
rest of the industrial world."4 In part this is due to the perception of
unions as unsophisticated. To combat this public perception the annual
union wage offensive called shunto (spring offensive) has been given a less
militant name, seikatsu toso, which translates into "campaign for a better
life," and instead of the traditional headbands worn in the past, pro-
testing workers now wear yellow baseball caps "to signify both corporate
loyalty and a cheerier image." " Another factor is the rather relaxed atti-
tude Japanese society has about law. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, Japan easily adopted a formal system of law, such as the com-
mercial codes of West Germany and France, precisely because the Japa-
nese had no deep commitment to those systems.1 6
Finally, Japanese managers, through the sheer act of purposeful
managing, never gave up their considerable control over fundamental
employment policies, most of which are not discussed with the unions at
the bargaining table. Japanese companies do not bargain over new tech-
nology, changes in plant organization, the relocation of factories, the
merger of firms, the closure of plants, subcontracting and the details of
daily production management. 7 Although companies keep these issues
off the bargaining table, they strongly believe in keeping workers well
13 See T. HANAMI, LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN TODAY (1979).
14 The unionization rate in Japan is down to a record low of 27.6%.
[T]he number of union member in Japan [in 1987] was 12,272 million, a decrease of 71,000
from the previous year. In addition, the estimated unionization rate [the rate of the
number of labor unionists to the number of employees] decreased 0.6 percentage points to
27.6% for the [twelfth] consecutive year-to-year decline since 1975, when it stood at
34.4%.
JAPAN INST. OF LAB., 27 JAPAN LAB. BuLL. 3 (Mar. 1988). See Bitter Days for Japan's Unions,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1987, at D-1. In 1949 union members constituted 56% of the workforce.
ECONOMIST 60 (Nov. 28, 1987).
15 EcONOMIST, supra note 14.
16 For a practical understanding of the Japanese legal scene, see Woodward, Legal Definitions:
Lawyers in U.S. Not What They Are Here - Contrasts in Training, Career Development Reflect Very
Different Concept of Law Itself, Japan Times, Oct. 3, 1982. See also C. Mayer, Japan Behind The
Myth of Japanese Justice, AM. LAW. 113-24 (July-Aug. 1984); J. RAMSEYER, Japan's Myth of Non-
Litigiousness, NAT'L L.J. 13, 46 (July 4, 1983). See generally Kawashima, The Status of the Individ-
ual in the Notion of Law, Right and Social Order in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND 261-87 (C.
Moore ed. 1967); Nakamura, Basic Feature of the Legal, Political, and Economic Thought of Japan,
in id. at 143-63; R. RABINOwrrz, LAW AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS IN JAPAN (1964).
17 Shirai, Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Japan, 123 INT'L LAB. REV. 312 (1984).
Vol. 14:29 1988
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informed. Union representatives are given detailed and often confidential
information on company plans and objectives. Information is regarded
as a working tool and not as a scarce resource hoarded by a status-driven
manager.
My study of the Japanese industrial relations scene tells me that the
top union leadership has no stomach for rocking the boat; nor have the
events of the 1950s been entirely forgotten by the union leaders. In those
years the automobile companies and other industries demolished the
ideologically radical national labor unions.18 In their place, they pro-
moted their own brand of non-ideological, cooperative, company unions.
These received the honorific title of "enterprise unions" and they lived
happily ever after as such. 9
Today, the handbook of the All Toyota Federation of Automobile
Workers speaks of the interdependence of labor and management "com-
parable to the right and left wheels of the car. Both wheels are required
for the automobile to move, and they move synchronously in whichever
direction the car is headed for." In the long run, overlooking the letter of
the law, and forging close personal relations between management and
labor proved beneficial to the permanent workforce which joined the new
type of bread and butter unions.
D. The United Kingdom
Thirty, twenty and even ten years ago, British union shop stewards
were often more powerful than company presidents. Who would have
predicted that a new scenario "From Turmoil to Cooperation" would
begin a long run on the British stage? That is what is happening now.
Probably, the people at Ford Motor Company in the United Kingdom20
would not agree that the millennium has arrived; or that a major cure for
the "English disease" has been found, but few would doubt that the com-
ing of the Japanese has made a difference, even in England. British labor
law now holds unions responsible for damages in tort, and limits picket-
ing, secondary boycotts, and restricts work stoppages not preceded by a
secret strike ballot.21 But to this day English law does not require com-
panies to recognize unions or bargain with them, or when bargaining, to
18 See generally M. CUSUMANO, THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY ch. 3 (1985) (This
chapter contains much of Cusumano's original research.); Shimada, The Perception and the Reality
of Japanese Industrial Relations, in THE JAPANESE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE (L. Thurow ed.).
19 Shimada, supra note 19, at 58-60. "Japanese style company union' systems also work to let
labor and management have common purpose." OVERSEAS DEP'T SUMITOMO CORP. 11 (March
1987).
20 See Basset, A Nettle That Unions Must Grasp, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 7; Buxton, Body
Blow for Dundee's Economic Revival, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 7; Ford Drops Scotland Plant
Plans Following Dispute With Unions, Investor's Daily, Mar. 18, 1988.
21 Townshend-Smith, Labor Law In Great Britain and America: the Similarity of the Underly-
ing Themes, 9 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 245-308 (1987). See Napier, Strikes and the Individual
Worker - Reforming the Law, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 287-302 (1987).
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define mandatory subjects as in the United States. British labor agree-
ments still are not enforceable contracts.
What has changed is that the law no longer predominates; the prac-
tice increasingly does. The entry of Japanese manufacturing companies
into Great Britain, as well as that of a number of non-Japanese corpora-
tions, was conditioned upon the recognition of a single union per plant
and on an agreement containing no-strike guarantees. In return for that,
English workers were given Japanese style management, emphasizing in-
formation sharing and egalitarian plant cultures.
For example, the three year old agreement between Nissan and the
principal engineering union ("AUEW") provides for sole bargaining
rights for one union; a Company Council made up of managers and di-
rectly elected employee representatives to consult and negotiate; the op-
tion of settling disputes by mutually agreed upon, binding interest
arbitration or striking upon expiration of the agreement; complete flexi-
bility in the use of labor by the company and acceptance of technological
change and all necessary training by employees; a few labor grades, no
rigid job descriptions, merit pay progressions for all employees; and egal-
itarian employment conditions, including monthly pay, common hours
of work, sick pay, no time clocks, and layoff procedures.22
The spread of the Nissan concept had the predictable effect on Brit-
ish organized labor. In January 1988, the leaders of the Transport and
General Workers Union went to the Japanese Embassy in London to
urge the Government to use its influence and convince the Japanese com-
panies to drop their insistence on reaching strike-free agreements under
an arrangement whereby British unions were competing in a coordinated
way for sole bargaining rights. The union pleaded for a "return to what
... was a previous and successful method of establishing good industrial
relations."23
What is it that successful competitors do that the less successful
companies do not do? Would less successful companies be better off if
restrictions were placed on their competitors? On the contrary; exper-
ienced business strategists tell us that the structure of the business firm
must be changed in order to operate in the business environment of the
1980s. There are several trends which dominate this business environ-
ment, according to Kenichi Ohmae, of McKenzie & Company: slow do-
mestic growth; slowdown in market growth for key industries; the
uneven distribution of resources between nations; and growing interna-
tional complexities due to the many legal, tax and monetary systems, not
to mention demanding political systems and ideologies.24
22 Nissan: A Deal For Teamwork and Flexibility?, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH RE-
PORT (U.K.) 2-7 (May 21, 1985).
23 Basset, TGWUAppeals to Japan Against Strike-Free Deals, Fin. Times, Jan. 20, 1988, at 10.
24 K. OHMAE, THE MIND OF THE STRATEGIST 165 (1983).
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II. WINNING STRATEGIES
Firms respond to these conditions in various ways. Of particular
interest to us are (1) the shifts from being labor-intensive to becoming
capital-intensive; (2) the shift from multinational to what Ohmae calls
multilocal; and (3) the shift to an entirely new business value-system.2"
The shift from labor- to capital-intensive industries can be observed
in the automobile, appliance, and semi-conductor industries; it expresses
itself in a reduction of labor content from about 25% to 10%. "The
labor-intensive industries of yesterday are becoming capital-intensive.
They no longer absorb large amounts of labor."26
Ohmae writes:
Managers... who have failed to catch onto what has been hap-
pening find their companies suffering excessive labor costs. There is
nothing to prevent them from investing to become more capital-inten-
sive; but it will do them no good, because they don't know how to get
rid of the people or how to generate enough jobs.27
The shift from being multinational to becoming multilocal explains,
for example, why a company like Honda enters a foreign high labor cost
market. Ohmae points out that at one time multinational corporations
established plants in low labor cost areas and focused their attention on
bringing down variable costs. Today they are shifting their operations to
fewer locations where they can secure large local markets. "In other
words they are turning into multi-local companies. "28
But even these successful local operations (IBM & Pepsico are ex-
amples) encountered difficulties in coping with changes that confronted
them. What has happened, Ohmae suggests, is that in these global firms
"brains and muscles . .. [kept being] separated, destroying the entire
body's coordination .... On one, hand there were the brains; on the other
there was the muscle - the people of the enterprise. They were there to
make the plan a reality, to carry out the brains' instruction. '29 Here is
where Western companies differed from their Japanese counterparts. In
the West we were told:
there were smart people and dumb people. The smart people were so
smart that they had to spell out every detail of the corporation's strat-
egy for three to five years into the future. They planned everything;
they knew the job description of every function. Thus the dumb peo-
ple never got the big picture. Instead of giving up on the smart people,
they just concentrated on the boring little details that they were still
allowed to control.30
25 Id. at 189-214.
26 Id. at 190.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 199.
29 Id. at 206.
30 Id.
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This did not happen in Japan "where people take their career paths
for granted . . . [and the] separation of brain and muscle rarely hap-
pens."31 Instead, the leading companies:
offer job security, tenure-based promotion, and internal development
of people instead of global recruiting campaigns. They provide endless
opportunities for employee participation. They regard their people as
members, not mere employees. They promote a common value sys-
tem. Knowing the critical importance of the corporation's long-term
well-being, they display a real commitment to the business they are in
instead of pursuing strictly financial objectives with only the stock-
holders in mind.32
The people value system of which Ohmae writes is not limited to
labor-management relations. This was brought home to me on my last
trip to Japan with a group of mid-western business people. We met
Isamu Sakamoto, whose name is not a household word unless you are in
the aluminum wire business or a Sumitomo stockholder. Sakamoto, a
retired executive and now senior advisor, talked to us about the different
way in which Japanese and Americans think about product quality and
delivery time.33
In the United States, he said, the relationship between buyers and
sellers is closely defined by contract and the position of buyers and sellers
is equal. Not so in his country, where the buyer's position is usually
superior to that of the seller. "[I]n the [United States] the responsibility
of a seller is to supply products which are made in compliance with the
specifications provided ... no more.., no less."' 34 But according to
Japanese trade customs, merely to supply products complying with the
contract is just not enough. There is implied that sellers are expected to
supply better products than specifications require, even if the contract
does not say so. If the seller supplied a product which only satisfies the
specifications and did not satisfy the buyer's expectations, the seller could
lose a chance at the next bid, even though the contractual responsibility
was fulfilled. Consequently, there is. quality competition in Japan, ac-
cording to Sakamoto, which could probably never occur in the United
States. This quality competition may be done within a very small range
"like increasing the electrical conductivity of aluminum from 61.4% to
61.6% when the minimum value required by the standard is 61%., 31
Although this is a very small range, Sakamoto assured us that enormous
efforts on the part of Sumitomo are required for such an improvement.
Why do not buyers specify their expectations explicitly in the first place,
we asked? "Regrettably," said Sakamoto, "such an idea is useless, be-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 207.
33 Address by Isamu Sakamoto, Senior Advisor, Sumitomo Corp., Osaka, Japan (Oct. 17,
1986).
34 Id. at 3.
35 Id. at 4.
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cause the new standard would merely become a new start line for new
competition." 6
As for delivery times, he noted another subtle difference.
In the [United States], if a seller is delayed in delivering goods, he
only has to pay a penalty, because that is what's in the contract....
This ... is not accepted in Japan even under the same contract condi-
tions .... [B]uyers expect sellers to prevent delayed deliveries, trying
to make every possible effort at any cost, even when it is economically
advantageous to the sellers ... [t]o delay ... delivery and [just] pay a
penalty for it.37
Sakamoto told us he has never seen a domestic contract in Japan
containing a force majeure clause excusing delivery because of unex-
pected delays due to labor disputes. In his country it is the manage-
ment's "most important and sacred responsibility to avert labor disputes
by all available means so that delivery delays do not occur."3"
For a lawyer, I have strayed far from the law. This is not because I
believe that law is unimportant in determining competitive success inter-
nationally. Of all legal categories, international trade agreements will get
our closest scrutiny at this conference, but it appears to me that the labor
relations laws of the major competing nations are not so very different
from one another that they affect competitive edge. The labor relations
practices, however, do make a difference - a big difference.
III. INVISIBLE ASSETS
I would like to conclude by bringing to your attention an exciting
idea which contains the answer to the challenge of competitiveness.
Hiroyuki Itami, a Japanese scholar from Hitotsubashi University in To-
kyo, also specializes in competitive strategies. He recently authored a
study entitled Mobilizing Invisible Assets, 9 in which he distills the com-
mon factors in Japanese competitive success. Itami arrived at two useful
concepts.
First, that of invisible assets of a firm, which is simply defined as the
knowledge, skills, and experience of committed people." Itami believes
that in the West we have tended to define assets too narrowly "identify-
ing only the assets which can be measured such as plants and equip-
ment. " 41 "Yet," he tells us, "the intangible assets, such as a particular
technology, accumulated consumer information, brand names, reputa-
tion, and corporate culture, are invaluable to a firm's competitive
36 Id.
37 Id. at 5.
38 Id. at 6.
39 H. ITAMI, MOBILIZING INVISIBLE ASSETS 1 (1987).
40Id. vii.
41 Id. at 1.
9
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power."'42 In fact he believes that "these invisible assets are often a firm's
only real source of competitive edge that can be sustained over time."'43
Itami offers a vivid analogy:
To make a painting, the artist has to be physically present in the
room and has to have enough money to buy brushes, canvas and paint.
Human, physical and monetary resources are needed to paint a pic-
ture, but not even resources will make the painting a masterpiece. For
that, something extra is needed, the painter's artistic sense and his
technique - his invisible assets.'
You can visualize a lawyer writing a brief!
The accumulation and depreciation of invisible assets are deter-
mined by a firm's strategy. Itami believes that the manager must dis-
cover the logic that will influence people's psychology, for it is people
who make or break the strategy. People are the invisible asset and people
also develop and maintain invisible assets. When Ross Perot assures us
that his thirteen points for a renewed GM will not cost a penny, he will
find Itami in full agreement. Invisible assets, according to Itami, can
often be generated with no additional effort in the course of the everyday
operation of the firm.
Itami's second concept is also quite uncomplicated. He speaks of
"overextension" as a growth strategy. This idea can be best described by
the adage that a company's reach should exceed its grasp. Itami explains:
"One reason to take an overextension strategy is to get a headstart in an
area the firm intends to enter later. The invisible assets acquired in an
early attempt, through tension and crisis, become the driving force as the
company becomes competitive in that field."
Economists of the past emphasized demand, capital investment, pro-
duction and so forth; all important, measurable aspects of competitive-
ness, but Itami's insights as well as those of Sakamoto, and Perot suggest
that it is the "soft, behavioral, dynamic" elements that make the real
difference. They all speak of companies that create people.
Ford is now advertising on TV that among American-made cars
Ford rates highest on dependability. Is this not a strangely weak adver-
tisement offered to us as an alternative to Honda and Toyota, which reg-
ularly run off with the honors in Consumer Reports? There is no labor
law that stands in the way of making American cars the most dependable
in the world.
Successful businesses (and law firms) must have a clear picture of
the effect of daily operations on accumulating invisible assets. If your
firm decided on buying a TV ad, it could have its name in front of mil-
lions of people in no time at all. On the other hand, having and main-
taining a great reputation for excellence in your specialty of the law is a
42 Id.
43 Id. at 12.
44 Id. at 14-15.
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superior, invisible asset of perhaps global significance. Group purpose,
creativity, information processing, training and developing people -
these count most of all, and, we can all agree, are relatively unaffected by
the legal climate.
11
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